The Transformative Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Higher Education: A Focus on Positive Outcomes

In Bangladesh, the legal landscape regarding third-party sexual history evidence (TPSHE), also known as ‘immoral character’ evidence, in rape trials has recently undergone significant transformations. While the Evidence Act 1872 previously permitted the inclusion of such evidence during cross-examination, recent amendments have abolished this provision. However, the current framework, without providing any gateways of admissibility, confers discretionary powers upon the court to determine the admissibility of question pertaining to TPSHE during cross-examination. Compared to Bangladesh, English rape law, in 1976, also afforded too much discretion to the judges despite banning a complainant from being questioned about her sexual history with third party. However, the attempt failed as the judges, by adopting their discretionary powers, frequently permitted third-party evidence. Consequently, the discretion of the court has been replaced by the adoption of four gateways to provide a clearer framework for admitting TPSHE. Nevertheless, despite this structured approach, a recent contentious judgment in the R v Ched Evans case by the Court of Appeal acquitted the defendant by admitting the TPSHE. The introduction of reliance on the court's discretion thus introduces potential risks and persistent challenges, highlighting the necessity for a structured legal framework to effectively address the complexities.